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Abstract. Most organisational disasters have warning signals prior to the event 
occurring, which are increasingly appearing in accident reports. In the case of the 
Mid-Staffordshire Disaster, the disaster was not as a result of component failure 
or human error but rather an organisation that drifted into failure with precursory 
warning signals being ignored. It has been estimated that between 400 and 1200 
patients died as a result of poor care between 2004 and 2009. The aim of this 
study was to identify the precursory signals and their rationalizations that oc-
curred during this event. Qualitative document analysis was used to analyse the 
independent and public inquiry reports. Signals were present on numerous system 
levels. At a person level, there were cases of staff trying to make management 
aware of the problems, as well as the campaign “Cure the NHS” started by be-
reaved relatives. At an organisational level, examples of missed signals included 
the decrease in the trust’s star rating due to failure to meet targets, the NHS care 
regulator voicing concern regarding the unusually high death rates and auditors’ 
reports highlighting concerns regarding risk management. At an external level, 
examples included negative peer reviews from various external organizations. 
 
Keywords: Healthcare Safety, Systems Approach, Weak Signals (need 3) 
1 Introduction 
An organisational disaster can be defined as a low-probability, high impact event with 
the potential to threaten an organisation’s survival [1]. Most organisational disasters 
have warning signals prior to the event occurring [2], which are increasingly appearing 
and receiving progressively more attention in accident reports. These warning signals 
are sensed information regarding emerging events [3], and include indicators or cues 
from the environment [4] which require interpretation and sensemaking [5]. Many of 
these warning signals are often also referred to as weak signals, as the information they 
contain is frequently imprecise and vague in nature [3].  
These signals are gaining increasing interest in the research community as they may 
provide an opportunity to achieve pro-activeness and promote effective risk manage-
ment, as they provide an opportunity “sooner-rather-than-later” for identifying 
problems that threaten safety [6]. Furthermore, by using signals, unexpected events may 
be addressed in a more cost-effective and timely manner [7]. In healthcare, this could 
result in significant benefits particularly with regards to patient health. Furthermore 
signals may provide an opportunity to render a system more resilient [8] as they provide 
insight regarding the status of the system and areas of risk [9]. By identifying where 
these signals originate from and understanding how signals are identified and inter-
preted, possible changes to work structure and management could be developed to en-
courage signal identification for promoting patient safety. Despite their potential for 
improving safety, research exploring signals, especially in healthcare, is limited.  
1.1 Case Study Description 
This case study focused on the failings surrounding the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foun-
dation Trust, which resulted in unacceptable standards of care for patients between the 
years of 2004 and 2009 [10]. During this time, there was a noted rise in patient mortality 
and complaints relating to clinical care, with an estimate of between 400 and 1200 ex-
cess deaths occurring during this time period [10]. As a result of the substandard care, 
many patients were left struggling to care for themselves [11]. The investigation into 
this organisational disaster found that the system failed to protect patients from unac-
ceptable risk, and in several cases inhumane treatment [12]. The systemic failings were 
so pronounced, that this event has been described as: 
 
 “the worst crisis any district general hospital in the NHS can ever have known” [12, p. 47]. 
 
Events contributing to the failings that resulted in unacceptable standards of care to 
occur at this Trust have been dated back to about 2001 [13]. Initial concerns regarding 
the Trust were report in August of 2001 and January 2002 to the NHS Executive West 
Midlands. These were related to staffing levels, leadership and management problems 
[13]. Over the period from 2004 to 2009, several key events or changes occurred within 
the organisation, that could be seen as contributing towards the downward spiral the 
Trust experienced. Some of these included the suspension of reporting patient com-
plaints to the hospital trust board from 2003 to 2006 [14], a financial recovery plan that 
was put in place in 2005, the modification of the ward structure to include two new 
units and reconfiguration of the clinical floors and at the end of 2005 the replacement 
of the Chief Executive [13]. Additionally the director of Nursing was replaced at the 
end of 2006, the Trust request £1 million for redundancies twice in 2006, and the Trust 
(the Mid-Staffordshire General Hospital NHS Trust) received foundation trust status 
beginning of 2008 [12]. Over this period, numerous reviews, audits and reports were 
conducted, of which many suggested concerns regarding staffing, managerial and other 
concerns.  
In 2008, the Health Care Commission (HCC) were approached based on above av-
erage mortality rates to investigate the Trust. The investigation found that the staffing 
shortages, operational problems and a lack of leadership meant that despite the best 
efforts of staff, the quality of care was compromised and patient safety was at risk [13]. 
In response to the HCC investigation, the above-average mortality rates and the 
persistent complaints made by a group of patients, named “Cure the NHS”, an inde-
pendent inquiry was launched [13]. 
The independent inquiry, which concluded in 2010 [11] and resulted in the publica-
tion of what has become known as the Francis Report, recounted detailed accounts of 
inadequate care and incidents that identified unexpected risks that patients experienced. 
These included malnutrition and dehydration [15]. Due to the extensive public outcry, 
the independent inquiry was followed by a public inquiry which concluded in 2013 
[12]. 
Numerous system factors were identified as contributing to the appalling standards 
of care patients received [12]. Examples of these included inadequate staffing, negative 
culture, professional disengagement regarding reporting concerns, poor governance, a 
lack of focus on standards of service, inadequate risk assessments, and incorrect prior-
ities [16]. 
The above description of the events surrounding the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foun-
dation Trust is a brief summary and not an exhaustive description of the events and 
occurrences. The purpose of this summary is to provide the context for the results in-
cluded below. Additional events will be mentioned in the results as they directly relate 
to signals. 
2 Method and Analysis Frameworks 
Signals and their relation to organizational disasters are gaining increasing interest and 
traction among the research community. Signals are increasingly mention in accident 
reports, with the an entire section of the Public Inquiry report [13] of the Mid-Stafford-
shire NHS Foundation Trust dedicated to them. The aim of this study was to analyse 
the signals identified in the 2013 report as well as other signals that could be extracted 
from the event descriptions included in both reports for this example of a healthcare-
related organisational disaster using a systems approach. The objectives of this case 
study included determining the possible sources of signals and the rationalizations that 
affect action and response to these signals.   
An explorative qualitative method was adopted to investigate these due to the fuzzy 
nature of weak signals. The two reports generated by the independent [11] and public 
[13] inquiries into this Mid-Staffordshire Disaster were selected for analysis using the-
matic analysis [17]. The signals and related events leading up to the May 2009 were 
included in the analysis.  
The two models selected for the analysis were the SEIPS 2.0 model [18] and the 
Weak Signals Framework [19]. The SEIPS 2.0 model was selected as it a systems 
model that has not only been used to understand healthcare processes better to improve 
patient safety [20], [21] but also to understand infection outbreaks within acute care 
settings to identify the larger system contributing factors of the outbreaks [22]. The 
Weak Signals Framework was selected for the analysis as it provides a structure for the 
analysis of weak signals in the context of the work, actions and events in the system in 
which they occur specific for the healthcare context. The framework provided a point 
of reference for the analysis of related and key information relating to signals. By 
analysing the signals from this perspective, one identifies the sources and the related 
rationalizations. This together provides a greater understanding on the context in which 
these signals occur. The Weak Signals Framework is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The Weak Signal Framework for the investigation of weak signals within the 
healthcare context. 
 
Signals were identified and grouped according to the elements in the sociotechnical 
work system, as described in the SEIPS 2.0 model, from which they originated, the 
types, and the associated rationalizations. All data were analysed using NVivo 10 (QSR 
International, 2014) using thematic analysis [17].  
3 Results 
From the analysis, an extensive list of signals, categorised according to the system lev-
els from which they originated was created. In addition to the examples of signals col-
lected, corresponding rationalizations were included where available for the signals.  
Numerous signals, some stronger than others, were extracted from the official re-
ports. A collection of examples from the different system levels, the year they were 
presented and the rationalizations for why no action was taken is included in Table 1. 
As is clear from the table, numerous signals were present over the time period, though 
many were rationalized away. From the analysis, it is clear that many different factors 
contributed to this disaster and numerous signals were present, but for brevity, only a 
few key examples are included here. The majority of the signals were identified from 
the person, organization and external environment levels of the Work System Element 
of the SEIPS 2.0 model. 
Table 1. A selection of signals, the year they occurred, and their corresponding rationalizations 
identified in the two reports. 
System  
Component 
Signal Examples  
(Year of occurrence) 
Rationalization 
Person 
 
Patient  
Complaints 
Patients reported inappropriate 
attitudes of staff (2002). 
Patient’s feared repercus-
sions. 
 Staff behaviour and complaints 
Staff voiced concerns regarding 
reconfiguration of wards (2005). 
Staff were told their input 
had been considered. 
 Whistleblow-ing 
Whistleblowing regarding con-
duct of senior staff (2005, 2007). 
She was advised to “keep 
her head down”. 
 
Management 
voiced  
concerns 
The medical director voiced 
concerns about the surgical de-
partment (2007) 
 
Organization 
 
 
Loss of star  
ratings 
 
Loss of star rating due to 
breaches in waiting times and  
financial deficit (2004). 
The tool was criticized 
for being a blunt assess-
ment tool.  
 
Financial  
recovery plan 
 
Despite staffing levels con-
cerns, a plan containing redun-
dancy was implemented (2005). 
Staff reductions seemed 
to be consistent with pro-
posed reduction in beds. 
 Negative  Statistics 
Mortality statistics were above 
average. 
There were concerns with 
the coding. 
Internal  
Environment 
Outbreaks 
 
Outbreaks of Clostridium dif-
ficile (2008, 2009) 
It was claimed an action 
plan was underway. 
External  
Environment 
 
 
 
 
Findings in  
Reviews,  
Audits and 
Surveys  
 
 
 
Reviews included Children’s 
Service Review (2003, 2004, 
2006, 2008), National Review of 
Medicines Management (2006), 
National Cancer Review (2005, 
2006), Royal College of Sur-
geons Review (2007) 
Rationalizations included 
it was thought action was 
being taken prior to the 
reports being published, 
the complaints were lim-
ited to one ward and not 
reflective of wider con-
cerns, and not all data 
had been submitted for 
consideration. 
 
Findings in  
Official  
Reports 
 
Reports included Commission 
of Health Improvement Report 
(2002), Barry Report (2005), Dr 
Foster Report (2007) 
 
HCC  
Investigations 
 
HCC investigation highlighted 
concerns regarding basic nurs-
ing care and medication (2008) 
Other regulation bodies 
decided to await the out-
come of the investigation 
 
Person level signals identified included patient complaints, staff complaints and behav-
iours, whistleblowing by staff and management staff voicing concerns. Highlighted in 
both the first and second inquiry reports, was that senior management was not made 
aware of the concerns of patients and frontline staff [12]. This is highlighted by the 
following extract: 
 “Incidences of poor care were not formally fed through the system and 
they were not supplied to commissioners or regulators… ”[13, p. 47]  
However, staff did speak up which was visible in several different types of signals. 
Examples of these include the person level signals relating to staff whistleblowing on 
senior staff’s conduct and staff voicing their complaints regarding the reconfiguration 
of certain wards. Furthermore, based on the Barry Report, published in 2005, which 
was a report generated as a result of a whistle blowing complaint, staff were trying 
make management aware of the current situation, which contradicts the above statement 
[13, p. 69]. With regards to staff voicing concerns regarding the reconfiguration of 
wards, this signal was met with the rationalization that the staff had already given input. 
Another example of a signal related to the concerns of staff, which was identified 
though an internal staff survey conducted in 2007, which could be seen as an organiza-
tion level signal, is highlighted by the following extract: 
 
“Concern was expressed at the percentage of staff who said they 
would not want to be treated at the hospital, nor wish a relative to be either.” [13, p. 98] 
 
An example of a signal that was identified where management staff voiced concern 
was that the medical director reported concerns about the surgical department. Elements 
of the strength of the signal and the response to signal is indicated in the extract below: 
 
“From the time of her appointment as Medical Director, … had harboured concerns about 
the Surgical Department. … She had a number of audits and other reviews undertaken but 
these came up with no evidence of concern. She approached the National Clinical Assessment 
Service (NCAS) who agreed with her proposal to invite the Royal College of Surgeons (RCS) to 
conduct a review…” [13, p. 111] 
 
This is a prime example of a weak signal, as the staff member was convinced that 
there was a problem despite evidence contradicting this. With hindsight, it has been 
confirmed that there were reasons for concern. 
Organization level signals identified included the loss of the Trust’s star rating; im-
plementation of a financial recovery plan that included redundancies despite staffing 
level concerns; and negative organizational statistics such as above average mortality 
statistics. The loss of stars signal was rationalized away in questioning the validity of 
the assessment tool. The rationalization for the financial recovery plan was that the 
proposed staff reductions were in-line with the proposed reduction in beds. The signal 
of the above average mortality rates appears to be one of the strongest signals in this 
case study. Despite the rationalization of the metric being subject to concerns, espe-
cially regarding the coding of the data, this signal, possibly in addition to several weaker 
ones, initiated the greatest response, namely the HCC investigation and the first inquiry. 
This signal was identified by several sources, and can be considered as an organization 
level signal. However, this signal also featured in the external environment signal “Dr 
Foster report”. The strength of the signal is highlighted by the extract below: 
 
“… it has to be concluded that this was a clear alarm bell requiring urgent action to find 
out whether this result could be explained by a review of the care provided.” [13, p. 100] 
 
Internal environment level signals identified included two outbreaks of Clostridium 
difficile, one in 2008 and 2009. These signals directly reflect the concerns relating to 
the key areas identified by the independent inquiry of continence, bladder and bowel 
care; safety; personal and oral hygiene; and cleanliness and infection control [11]. Fur-
thermore, following the outbreak in 2008, senior staff raised concerns, which should 
have been a signal to management, as they felt unhappy about the Trust's reaction to 
outbreak as there had been an insufficient sense of urgency. 
 External environment level signals identified included the findings of external and 
peer reviews, audits and surveys; findings from official reports and the HCC investiga-
tion. Several reviews, investigations, audits and surveys were repeated over the time 
period in question whereby on numerous occasions similar results were found. Numer-
ous concerns highlighted in the report published in 2010 were concerns that had been 
mentioned in earlier reports, for example the Barry Report in 2005 highlighted inade-
quate handovers, deficient note keeping, poor standards of care, inappropriate manage-
ment style and inappropriate behaviour by staff [13, p. 64]. 
The HCC investigation was an unusual event and should have been considered as a 
signal to other regulatory bodies that there was a need for concern regarding this Trust’s 
performance. Other oversight and regulation bodies decided to await the outcome of 
the investigation, which is a form of rationalization.  
4 Discussion and Recommendations 
The events surrounding the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust can be quali-
fied as an organizational disaster by the definition provided in the introduction [1], as 
in its entirety it was a high impact event that threatened the survival of the organization, 
in this case this specific Trust. As a result of this organizational failure, numerous pa-
tients lost their lives, experienced unacceptable standards of care and undignified treat-
ment, and in addition to this, the inquiries into this event have cost approximately £19 
million and ultimately have led to the trust being dissolved in 2014 and services being 
relocated to other centres.  
In this case study, the drift into failure through ignoring precursory signals is quite 
evident. This is visible in that as system components and safety processes were failing, 
the signals indicating this were rationalised away or the response was too weak to pre-
vent the failures from still occurring. This is visible from the results above, specifically 
with regards to the numerous signals available over the time period as well as the rep-
etition of various signals.  
Through the analysis of signals and their rationalizations in this case study, insights 
into the characteristics of signals can be extracted. The characteristics included the 
repetition of signals and the accumulative effect of signals. One would expect the extent 
and severity of what was occurring, to have been derivable from some individual sig-
nals if they were clear and strong enough, for example the higher system level signals 
such as Commission of Health Improvement Report in 2002 or the loss of the star rating 
in 2004. But also, a combination of slightly weaker signals, repetition or the accumula-
tion of these signals should have notified management of what was occurring. Exam-
ples of repeated signals included the outbreak of Clostridium difficile and external peer 
reviews.  
Furthermore the clarity of the information regarding what was occurring at this Trust 
should have become more apparent with the repetition or accumulation of signals [23]. 
The findings in official investigations and reports, which provide evidence-based infor-
mation, and as a result may be considered as relatively strong higher system level sig-
nals, can be seen as an accumulation of signals. The reports usually comprised of an 
accumulation of lower system level signals, including person level signals, for example 
patient complaints and staff behaviours, task level signals and internal environment 
level signals. But in this case study, the majority of the signals, both lower and higher 
system level signals, were rationalized away, and then occurred later in the timeline 
again.  
A common theme among the rationalizations was that the Trust assured external and 
regulatory bodies that progress had been made in correcting perceived deficiencies at 
numerous different time points. And there appeared to have been a lack of follow up 
on the previously generated reports. Additional system factors that prevented signals 
from being noticed and responded to include a negative culture, professional disengage-
ment regarding reporting concerns, poor governance, a lack of focus on standards of 
service, inadequate risk assessment of staff reduction, and incorrect priorities[12]. 
The case study also highlights how rationalizations from one signal may impact the 
“face-value” of other signals. An example of this was that it was felt that if the severe 
staff cutting to meet the needs of the cost improvement plan had negative effects, this 
would have been highlighted in other performance measures. But unfortunately, the 
Trust’s performance measures had been highlighted as unreliable and the systems for 
collecting and coding for these measures were seen as inadequate. 
 
5 Conclusion 
Signals provide an opportunity for insight regarding the status of the system and areas 
of risk [9]. But unfortunately, these signals are often rationalized away. As with many 
organisational disasters, this one too highlights the difficulty of recognising and accu-
rately acting upon signals of imminent failure [2]. This case study highlighted examples 
of numerous different system level signals and their associated rationalizations. The 
source of the signals was a focus of this case study as incorporating signals in risk 
management requires being able to identify where these signals originate, namely 
“knowing where to look for them”. The second key focus of this case study was that of 
the rationalizations of signals. One needs to know the rationalizations for signals to 
better understand the factors that hinder acting upon them when identified.  
It is the hope of this research that by understanding why signals were dismissed pre-
viously and the responses taken in the past, a better action plan may be developed for 
the current unfolding situation. One needs experience or cases to create precedents, 
which one needs to assist in creating operational policy. This case study is an example 
of how healthcare can suffer from an organizational failure. It is essential that one learns 
as much as possible to inform policy and procedure so that safe guards for this kind of 
failure can be developed and put in place. 
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